Abstract. SMS4 is a 128-bit block cipher used in WAPI (the Chinese national standard for wireless networks). Up until recently, the best attacks on SMS4 known, in terms of the number of rounds, were the rectangle attack on 14 rounds and the impossible differential attack on 16 rounds (out of 32 rounds) presented by Lu. While analyzing them, we noticed that these attacks have flaws and that their complexity analysis is inaccurate. In this paper we make a more comprehensive analysis of these attacks and further improve these results.
Introduction
SMS4 [1] is a Generalized Feistel Network (GFN) cipher, specified in the Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI), which is mandatory in wireless networks in China. The cipher has block size of 128 bits, and each block is processed in 32 rounds using a secret key of 128 bits long.
The Chinese Standards Association (SAC) submitted WAPI to ISO for recognition as an international standard, at about the same time as the IEEE 802.11i standard. As a result, SMS4 was the subject of an extensive international debate since its introduction. Despite that, up until recently little cryptanalysis of SMS4 was performed. The previously published cryptanalytic results are the differential fault analysis presented in [11] , the integral attack on 13 rounds [8] , the rectangle attack on 14 rounds and the impossible differential attack on 16 rounds [9] , the rectangle attack on 16 rounds and the differential attack on 21 rounds [12] , and finally the rectangle attack on 18 rounds, the differential attack and linear attack on 22 rounds [6] 1 .
The cryptanalytic results on SMS4, on which we focus are those of [9] . The proposed rectangle attack on 14 rounds of SMS4 uses 2 121.82 chosen plaintexts and has a claimed time complexity of 2 116.66 14-round SMS4 computations 2 . The impossible differential attack on 16-round SMS4 from [9] uses 2 105 chosen plaintexts and its time complexity is conjectured to be 2 107 16-round SMS4 computations.
While verifying the results of [9] , we found several flaws and possible improvements. In this paper, we show that the actual probability of the 12-round rectangle distinguishers of [9] is 2 −230.71 , rather than the claimed probability of 2 −237.64 . We also present better 12-round rectangle distinguishers with probability of 2 −209.78 . Moreover, we show that the claimed time complexity of the rectangle attack of [9] is flawed due to the deficient process of obtaining candidate quartets, which is not considered in the original time complexity analysis. Therefore, given our improved distinguishers and refined analysis, we present a 14-round rectangle attack that uses 2 106.89 chosen plaintexts pairs and has running time of 2 107.89 encryptions for obtaining the data, 2 107.89 memory accesses to find the pairs, and 2
87.97 encryptions for the analysis. Similarly, we identify several flaws in the impossible differential attack of [9] . We first show that more data is needed than the claimed figures, and then we point out a delicate issue concerning the running time of this attack. We then follow to suggest a corrected attack with data complexity of 2 117.06 chosen plaintexts and time complexity of 2 117.06 encryptions for obtaining the data, 2 132.06 memory accesses for the preliminary elimination, and 2
95.09 encryptions for the analysis.
Independent of our research, SMS4 was analyzed also in [6, 12] . A rectangle attack on 16 rounds of SMS4 which requires 2 124 chosen plaintexts with a time complexity of 2 116 encryptions, and a differential attack on 21 rounds of SMS4 with data and time complexities of 2 118 and 2 112.83 , respectively are presented in [12] . These results are improved in [6] , by using the early abort technique, to a rectangle attack on 18 rounds of SMS4 with a data complexity of 2 120 and time complexity of 2 116.83 , a differential attack on 22 rounds of SMS4 with a data complexity of 2 118 chosen plaintexts, and a time complexity of 2 125.71 encryptions. Also, a linear attack on 22 rounds of SMS4 which has data complexity of 2 117 known plaintexts, and time complexity of 2 109.86 encryptions is described in [6] . This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief description of the SMS4 cipher and its properties. In Section 3, we give an overview of the rectangle attack, followed by the previous rectangle attack of [9] on SMS4. Then, we present our observations and improvements for this attack on SMS4. In Section 4, we follow the same outline for the impossible differential attack. Finally, we conclude this paper and summarize our findings in Section 5.
A Description of SMS4

Notation
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notation. Each 128-bit block is composed of four 32-bit words (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ). Note that the words and blocks are in a "Chinese"-endian order (i.e., the most significant bit is the leftmost bit numbered 0, and the least significant bit is bit 31 for a 32-bit word). Similarly, the most significant byte of a word is the leftmost byte numbered 0, and least significant byte is numbered 3. We denote the bit rotation of the word w by r positions to the left by w ≪ r; e j denotes a word whose all positions except the j-th bit are zero and e i1,...,ij = e i1 ⊕ ... ⊕ e ij for 0 ≤ i 1 , . . . , i j ≤ 31
The SMS4 Cipher
SMS4
[1] accepts a 128-bit plaintext P = (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) and a 128-bit user key as inputs, and is composed of 32 rounds. In each round, the least significant three bytes of the state are xored with the round key and the result passes the S transformation. The S transformation uses an 8-bit to 8-bit bijective SBox four times in parallel to process each byte, then the concatenated bytes are processed using a linear transformation L.
) denote the 128-bit input and output to the i-th round, respectively. Then the round function may be formally described by the following equations:
where the S transformation uses the SBox given in [1] and L is the linear transformation:
The transformation L • S is named T in the specification document. RK i is the 32-bit round sub key for the i-th round, obtained from the key schedule. Decryption is identical to the encryption except for the order of the subkeys, which are used in the reverse order.
Key Schedule: The key schedule is similar to the encryption function. The only difference is that instead of using the linear transformation L, the following linear transformation L ′ is used:
In addition, the user supplied key K is xored with a system parameter, F K.
The subkey RK j of the j-th round is computed as follows:
where CK j = (ck j,0 , ck j,1 , ck j,2 , ck j,3 ) and ck j,k = 28j + 7k (mod 256).
Properties and Definitions
Since SMS4 uses a bijective SBox, thus, S(∆x) = 0 if and only if ∆x = 0. The difference distribution table (DDT) of the SBox contains exactly 127 nonzero output differences for a given nonzero input difference. Only one of these values has probability of 2 −6 while the other 126 remaining nonzero values have probability of 2 −7 . The following definitions are used for observing the propagation of any nonzero input difference to the other rounds. In [9] , it is not clearly stated to what these sets refer, and the formulas contain typos. Thus, the reader may find the original terminology confusing. Therefore, we rewrite the equations defining these sets, using the same names for the sets (but with a clearer representation).
Given the input difference (0, e Λ , e Λ , e Λ ) to the n-th round, where Λ is an arbitrary but nonempty subset of {0, 1, . . . , 31}, the set θ(e Λ ) is composed of all the 32-bit differences that an input difference e Λ to the T function can cause:
Now, the input difference to the (n + 1)-th round is (e Λ , e Λ , e Λ , X) where X ∈ θ(e Λ ). The Υ (e Λ , X) is the set of all 32-bit differences, that an input difference X to the T function may cause after an xor with e Λ .
Similarly, the input difference to the (n+2)-th round is of the form (e Λ , e Λ , X, Y ) where X ∈ θ(e Λ ) and Y ∈ Υ (e Λ , X). The corresponding 32-bit output differences, caused by an input difference e Λ ⊕ X ⊕ Y to T are denoted by the set Π(e Λ , X, Y ).
Finally, the input difference to the (n + 3)-th round is of the form (e Λ , X, Y, Z) where X ∈ θ(e Λ ), Y ∈ Υ (e Λ , X), and Z ∈ Π(e Λ , X, Y ) . The set of 32-bit differences after the XOR operation in the (n+3)-th round by an input difference X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z to T is denoted by the set Ω(X, Y, Z).
The Rectangle Attack
The amplified boomerang and rectangle attacks [2] are a chosen plaintext attacks, which evolved from the boomerang attack [10] . The main idea in these attacks is to use two short differential characteristics with high probabilities instead of one long characteristic with a lower probability. The only difference is that the boomerang attack generates a quartet at an intermediate value halfway through the cipher, whereas the rectangle attack looks for quartets within a given set of pairs.
For this purpose, the block cipher E is treated as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E 0 and E 1 (i.e, E = E 1 • E 0 ). Assume that a differential characteristics ∆ → ∆ * with probability p for E 0 , and ∇ * → ∇ with probability q for E 1 are known. The boomerang attack is based on generating right quartets (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) which satisfy a set of relations:
A right quartet which satisfies the above equations is formed as follows:
1. Choose a random plaintext P 1 and compute P 2 = P 1 ⊕ ∆. 2. Ask for the encryptions of P 1 and P 2 to obtain C 1 = E(P 1 ) and C 2 = E(P 2 ). 3. Calculate C 3 = C 1 ⊕ ∇ and C 4 = C 2 ⊕ ∇. 4. Ask for the decryptions of C 3 and C 4 to obtain P 3 = D(C 3 ) and P 4 = D(C 4 ). 5. Check whether P 3 ⊕ P 4 = ∆.
The amplified boomerang attack is a chosen plaintext attack in which the same differential conditions have to be satisfied. But instead of generating quartets as given above, a set of plaintext pairs with input difference ∆ is generated. Then the aim is to find quartets ((P 1 , P 2 ), (P 3 , P 4)) such that C 1 ⊕ C 3 = ∇ = C 2 ⊕ C 4 when P 1 ⊕ P 2 = ∆ = P 3 ⊕ P 4 by using birthday paradox.
By a more careful analysis and a better key recovery algorithm, the amplified boomerang attack was evolved into the rectangle attack. For an optimized method of finding the right rectangle quartet, one may refer to [3] .
In [2, 10] , it is shown that it is possible to use all possible ∆ * 's and ∇ * 's simultaneously. In [2] , it is also stated that, if N plaintext pairs with input difference ∆, then the number of expected right quartets is N 2 2 −128p2q2 for 128-bit block ciphers, wherê
The Rectangle Attack on 14-Round SMS4 from [9] The 14-round rectangle attack in [9] uses 12-round rectangle distinguishers with probability 3 2 −230.71 and requires 2 121.82 chosen plaintexts to attack 14-round SMS4. Let E 0 denote rounds 0 to 7 and let E 1 denote rounds 8 to 11 of SMS4. The differentials used for the 12-round distinguishers of [9] are as follows:
1. For E 0 : All 8-round differentials of the form (e ψ1 , e ψ , e ψ , e ψ ) → (e ψ2 , e ψ3 , e ψ4 , e ψ5 ) where only one byte of e ψ is nonzero and e ψ1 , e ψ2 ∈ θ(e ψ ), e ψ3 ∈ Υ (e ψ , e ψ2 ), e ψ4 ∈ Π(e ψ , e ψ2 , e ψ3 ), e ψ5 ∈ Ω(e ψ2 , e ψ3 , e ψ4 ), and e ψ1 is fixed. 2. For E 1 : All 4-round differentials of the form (e Φ , e Φ , e Φ , 0) → (e Φ , e Φ , e Φ , e Φ2 ) where only one byte of e Φ is nonzero and e Φ2 ∈ θ(e Φ ).
To calculate the overall probability, the sum of the squares of the probabilities of all used differentials is needed. As there are many 8-round differential characteristics, we list the ones that follow the path in Table 1 . In Table 2 , we list how many differential characteristics of a given probability follow this path.
Therefore, the lower bound can be calculated as:
We note that the second differential is a truncated differential with 127 possible output differences and probability one. Therefore: Thus, the expected number of right rectangle quartets generated by N plaintext pairs is:
Attack Procedure: The above 12-round distinguishers are used to mount a rectangle attack on 14-round SMS4. Given the 127 input differences 4 (e Φ , e Φ , e Φ , e Φ2 ) to round 12, there are 127 5 possible output differences (e Φ , e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 ) just after round 12, where e Φ3 ∈ Υ (e Φ , e Φ2 ) and 127 9 possible output differences (e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 , e Φ4 ), where e Φ4 ∈ Π(e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 ). For sake of clarity, we define all these output differences by the set Φ: Φ = {(e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 , e Φ4 )|e Φ2 ∈ Θ(e Φ ), e Φ3 ∈ Υ (e Φ , e Φ2 ), e Φ4 ∈ Π(e Φ , e Φ2 , e Φ3 )} The proposed attack uses an early abort technique, which allows partially determining whether or not a candidate quartet is a right one by guessing only a small fraction of the subkey, and if not discarding the quartet.
The attack procedure of [9] is as follows:
1. Choose 2 120.82 pairs of plaintexts 5 (P i , P ′ i ) with input difference (e ψ1 , e ψ , e ψ , e ψ ) (a) Obtain the corresponding ciphertext pairs (
i. Guess the j-th byte of the subkey RK 13 and partially decrypt every remaining quartet to obtain the j-th byte of their intermediate values just after the S transformation in round 13. Denote them by
i1.i2,j and keep only the quartets for which both equalities are satisfied. 
For each remaining quartet ((T
i1 , T ′ i1 ), (T i2 , T ′ i2 )) repeat
Improving the 14-Round Attack
By a simple observation, one can conclude that E 0 in the 14-round attack has too many rounds. After round 3, each additional round comes with a cost (in terms of probability) increasing exponentially. Therefore, the attack can be improved by using a shorter characteristic for E 0 with higher probability in exchange for making E 1 longer. We suggest the use of following differential characteristics:
1. For E 0 : The 6-round differentials (e ψ1 , e ψ , e ψ , e ψ ) → (e ψ , e ψ , e ψ2 , e ψ3 ) where only one byte of e ψ is nonzero, e ψ1 , e ψ2 ∈ θ(e ψ ), e ψ3 ∈ Υ (e ψ , e ψ2 ), and e ψ1 is fixed. 2. For E 1 : The 6-round differentials (e Φ6 , e Φ5 , e Φ , e Φ ) → (e Φ , e Φ , e Φ , e Φ2 ) where only one byte of e Φ is nonzero and e Φ5 , e Φ2 ∈ θ(e Φ ), e Φ6 ∈ Υ (e Φ , e Φ5 ).
The details of the rectangle distinguishers for the original attack and the proposed improvement are given in Table 3 .
The probability of the new proposed distinguisher can be calculated as follows:
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.1, there exists one possible e ψ2 with probability 2 −6 and 126 possible e ψ2 values with probability 2 −7 in round 4. And in round 5, for each of the e ψ2 values, we have one possible e ψ3 with probability 2 −24 , ( Table 1 . b The probability of eΦ 5 is equal to the probability of e ψ 2 , since they both belong to the same set. Similarly eΦ 6 and e ψ 3 have the same probability.
Similarly, for E 1 , in round 7, we have one possible e Φ5 with probability 2
and 126 possible e Φ5 with probability 2 −7 . In round 6, for each of the e Φ5 values, there is one possible e Φ6 with probability 2 −24 , ( 
Thus, the expected number of right quartets generated by N plaintext pairs is:
In order to have sufficient pairs to perform the improved attack N = 2 106.89 and from this point on we use this figure throughout the analysis.
A flaw in the preliminary elimination: In the original attack of [9] , the time complexity is calculated only for candidates of right quartets after the preliminary elimination (the pairs which enter Step 2), and it does not include the time-complexity of the first elimination itself. However, due to the large amount of data, it is impossible to take all the possible pairs and detect candidates for right quartets immediately. We propose the following algorithm for the detection of right quartet candidates:
A more efficient algorithm for the preliminary elimination: candidates of right quartets. The time complexity of the attack is dominated by the partial decryptions in Step 2(b) for j=0 in [9] . Therefore, the running time of steps 2-4 of the attack is 2 8 · 2 83.6 · 1/14 = 2 87.69 . The total running time is dominated by Step 1, i.e. 2 107.89 memory accesses.
4 Impossible Differential Attack on 16-Round SMS4
Impossible Differential Attack
Unlike traditional differential cryptanalysis which tracks differences that propagate through the cipher with high probability, impossible differential cryptanalysis exploits differentials with probability zero. The attack used in [9] is a combination of the general technique called miss in the middle, which is used to construct impossible differential, and the early abort technique which partially determines whether or not a candidate pair is useful. The main idea is to find two characteristics with probability one, whose conditions cannot be met together [4] . Then, the key can be found by analyzing the rounds surrounding the impossible event, and guessing the subkeys of these rounds. If the impossible event occurs when a candidate key is used, it is obvious that the suggested key is not the right key.
The Previous Attack on 16-Round SMS4
The attack uses a set of 12-round impossible differentials of the form (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) → (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ). Two 6-round differentials with probability one are concatenated for the attack. The first differential used in the construction of the impossible differential is (e Γ , e Γ , e Γ , 0) → (e Γ , x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ) and the second differential is (z 2 , y 2 , x 2 , e Γ ) → (0, e Γ , e Γ , e Γ ), where x i ∈ Θ(e Γ ), y i ∈ Υ (e Γ , x i ), z i ∈ Π(e Γ , x i , y i ) for i = 1, 2. These 12-round differentials are used to conduct an impossible differential attack on SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds by adding two additional rounds before and after the differentials.
The attack uses Γ ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 15}. Hence, in round 1, for every Γ , there are 127 2 input differences that may lead to e Γ as the output difference of T, and they can be generated by 127 6 input differences in round 0, which is denoted by the set Σ 1 (Γ ) for each Γ . Similarly, there are 127 2 output differences after round 14, that can be generated by e Γ , and they cause 127 6 possible output differences after round 15 which, is denoted by the set Σ 2 (Γ ) for each Γ .
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1. Choose 2 9 structures of 2 96 plaintexts each where the most significant 2 bytes of the two rightmost words of the plaintexts in each structure is fixed. (Thus, The claimed time complexity of this attack is of 2 107 16-round SMS4 computations in [9] and it requires 2 105 chosen plaintexts.
Fixing and Improving the 16-Round Attack
Like in the rectangle attack of [9] , in the impossible differential attack of [9] , the time complexity analysis is also calculated only for candidates of right pairs after preliminary elimination (the pairs which enter
Step 2), and it does not include the time complexity of the first elimination itself. Also, the data complexity suggested in [9] is too low.
Data Complexity Issues:
Each structure is composed of 2 96 plaintexts of the form ( * , * , (a, b i ), (c, d i )) where * denotes all possible values and a, c denote the chosen constants of the structure, i.e., each structure suggests (2 96 ) 2 /2 = 2 191 pairs. In order to have the desired input difference ( * , * , e Γ , e Γ ), we must have 6 ≃ 2 42 possible input differences for each Γ . Therefore, the probability of a pair to have P 1 ⊕ P 2 ∈ Σ 1 (Γ ) is 2 42 /2 64 = 2 −22 , and 2 175 · 2 −22 = 2 153 pairs pass this step. Note that once the plaintext pair is fixed, Γ is also fixed, so does Σ 1 (Γ ) and Σ 2 (Γ ). Similar to Σ 1 (Γ ), Σ 2 (Γ ) is composed of 127 6 ≃ 2 42 possible output differences for each Γ . Therefore, the probability of a pair to have C 1 ⊕ C 2 ∈ Σ 2 (Γ ) is 2 42 /2 128 = 2 −84 and the number of pairs for a given structure passing the Step 1 of the algorithm is 2 153 · 2 −84 = 2 69 . Starting with S such structures, the number of plaintext pairs passing the preliminary elimination is S·2
69 . The probability that a given subkey is discarded by a given structure is thus, 2 69 · (2 −7 ) 12 = 2 −15 , and that it is not discarded by all S structures is (1 − 2 −15 ) S . In order to discard all wrong subkeys, we need to make sure that the probability of a wrong key to remain is about 2 −96 , i.e., 2
, it is not probable to discard most of the subkey guesses.
The number of required structures can be calculated as follows: There are 2 96 possible subkeys, and S · 2 −15 pairs are expected for each subkey. In order to have all wrong subkeys with one pair (i.e., suggested by some pair and thus identified as wrong ones), the probability of a wrong key to have no pairs should be less than 2 −96 . The probability of having no pairs is e −S·2
−15 . Solving this, we obtain that S = 2 21.06 structures are needed for the attack.
Algorithm for the detection of candidate pairs: Denote a plaintext by
1. Insert every plaintext-ciphertext pair (P i , C i ) of each structure, indexed by the least significant 2 bytes of the rightmost two words of the plaintext and the most significant two words of the corresponding ciphertext (i.e, b i ||d i ||w i ||x i ||y i ||z i ) into a hash table. 2. For eachẽ Γ :
(a) For every non-empty bin satisfying b i < b j : i. go to the corresponding bin: b i ||d i ||w i ||x i ||y i ||z i ⊕ẽ Γ ||ẽ Γ ||e Γ ||e Γ = b j ||d j ||w j ||x j ||y j ||z j (i.e. w i = w j and y i = y j ). ii. For all possible combinations of entries, pick the plaintext pairs for which: A. P i,1 ⊕ P j,1 ∈ θ(e Γ ) B. C i,2 ⊕ C j,2 ∈ θ(e Γ ) C. P i,0 ⊕ P j,0 ∈ Υ (e Γ , P i,1 ⊕ P j,1 ) D. C i,3 ⊕ C j,3 ∈ Υ (e Γ , C i,2 ⊕ C j,2 ) is satisfied. However, the time complexity of the attack is dominated by the 2 117.06 partial encryptions required to obtain the ciphertext pairs in Step 1, and by the 2 132.06 memory accesses performed for the preliminary elimination.
Summary
In this paper, we reviewed the rectangle attack on 14-rounds and impossible differential attack on 16-rounds SMS4 presented by Lu. We identified some flaws in the attack algorithms and in the time and data complexity analysis of these attacks. We then followed by correcting and improving these attacks.
We first showed that a better 12-round rectangle distinguisher with probability 2 −209.78 can be found, reducing the amount of required chosen plaintexts to perform the attack from 2 121.82 to 2 107.89 . Then, we presented a more efficient algorithm to perform the preliminary elimination.
We also identified some flaws in the previous impossible differential attack of [9] . We first showed that more data is needed for the analysis, and we also presented a more efficient algorithm for the preliminary elimination. The results are summarized in Table 5 .
